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Abstract and Keywords
Intentionality comes from the Latin verb intendo meaning to aim, hold out, or stretch. In 
the context of phenomenology, it refers to consciousness’s ability to be of or about things
—how consciousness can direct itself toward objects internal (images, memories, etc.) 
and external (things, relations, and events in the world). Phenomenologists argue that 
intentionality is a central feature of consciousness. This article discusses 
phenomenological approaches to intentionality. It consider intentionality’s mental, motor, 
and affective dimensions as developed within the phenomenological tradition. It also 
considers why phenomenologists think intentionality is integral to subjectivity, and how 
this qualitative orientation can help illuminate the lived experience of psychopathological 
conditions, some of which appear to involve subtle disturbances of intentionality.
Keywords: intentionality, embodiment, affectivity, phenomenology, psychopathology, schizophrenia, Brentano, 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre
Introduction
Right now, you’re probably conscious of many things: for example, the words on the page
—or rather the meaning of the words on the page as your eyes skim across them. But 
you’re probably conscious of other things, too: the slight twinge in your back from sitting 
too long, the faint aroma of coffee in the mug on your desk, or the nagging feeling that 
you’ve forgotten to do something. These different things are objects of your 
consciousness.
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This feature of consciousness—its ability to be about things—is what philosophers call 
“intentionality.” The term comes from the Latin verb intendo, which means to aim, hold 
out, or stretch. In this technical sense, intentionality refers to the way consciousness can 
stretch out or be directed toward objects internal (images, memories, etc.) and external 
(things, relations, and events in the world). Conscious mental states are never empty but 
always of or about something.
Phenomenologists argue that intentionality is a central feature of consciousness. Edmund 
Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, appropriated the notion from his teacher Franz 
Brentano, who rejuvenated discussions of intentionality found in medieval philosophers 
like Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. And these thinkers 
appropriated discussions going back to Greek philosophers like Aristotle and 
Empedocles. We also find sophisticated discussions of intentionality in non-Western 
traditions—for example, sixth- and seventh-century Indian Buddhist thinkers like Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti (Coseru 2012).
I focus here on phenomenological approaches to intentionality since they’re particularly 
relevant to psychopathology. Not only have phenomenologists spent more time 
considering intentionality than other philosophical traditions. They’ve also broadened 
discussions to consider intentionality’s embodied and affective dimensions—themes 
helpful for understanding the character of some psychopathological conditions. 
Phenomenologists are concerned not simply with the formal or logical properties of 
intentionality (cf. Searle 1983) but rather with how intentionality is integral to 
subjectivity. This qualitative orientation can help illuminate the lived experience of 
psychopathological conditions, some of which appear to involve subtle disturbances of 
intentionality.
Brentano on Intentionality
Phenomenologists take their characterization of intentionality from Brentano, who looked 
to construct a “descriptive psychology” (or what he sometimes calls “phenomenology”): a 
descriptive analysis of experience from the inside (Brentano 1995a). Brentano insists that 
intentionality must be at the center of this project. Intentionality, he tells us, “is 
characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits 
anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are 
those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves” (Brentano 
1995b: 68). For Brentano, intentionality not only distinguishes mental from physical 
phenomena. It also gives individual mental states their distinctive character: “Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as an object within itself, although they do not 
all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something 
is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on” (Brentano 
1995b: 68).
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Several points are important. First, Brentano argues that each type of conscious act is 
constituted as the kind of act it is only via its relation to its intentional object. An act of 
perception is only such in relation a perceptual object; likewise, other conscious mental 
states like beliefs, desires, memories, and emotions. Accordingly, to understand the 
ontology of consciousness, we must investigate the different relations that connect 
conscious acts with their respective intentional objects. As later phenomenologists will 
insist, this feature of intentionality illustrates that consciousness is a relational
phenomenon. We are “through and through compounded of relationships with the 
world” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: xiv).
Second, looking at how conscious acts relate to their intentional objects allows us to 
individuate different acts. The same intentional object—a bottle of Belgian beer, say—can 
be the intentional object of multiple conscious acts. I can believe the beer is in my 
refrigerator, desire the beer, and upon opening my refrigerator, visually perceive the beer. 
In each case, the bottle of beer stands in a distinct relation to the act within which it is 
present as intentional object. And this is significant, phenomenologists insist, because 
these different relations enable us to distinguish the character and structure of different 
conscious acts within the inventory of all possible mental activity. Intentionality is the tool 
that enables these taxonomic considerations.
Finally, this way of thinking about intentionality is different from other ways of 
characterizing mind–world relations as primarily involving causality. Intentional relations 
need not be causal relations; minds can intend non-existent objects like unicorns and 
Sherlock Holmes—or existent objects beyond our perceptual reach (e.g. distant planets), 
or even objects that once existed but no longer do (e.g. my deceased grandmother). To be 
clear, the intentional relation itself is, in these cases, very real. I can feel strongly about a 
fictional literary character, say, or be moved by the memory of my beloved dead 
grandmother. But neither the literary character nor my beloved grandmother exist as 
objects in the world. The form of my conscious relation to them will, accordingly, be 
different than mind–world relations characterized exclusively by appealing to causal 
descriptions involving existent entities. This is particularly useful in the context of 
phenomenological psychopathology, which may involve investigating how individuals 
experientially relate to non-existent individuals, objects, and events.
Beyond Brentano: Mental, Bodily, and Affective 
Dimensions of Intentionality
Although nearly all major phenomenologists quibble with different parts of Brentano’s 
analysis—especially his idea that intentional objects are “in” consciousness as mental 
intermediaries between mind and world—they nevertheless agree that investigations of 
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consciousness must begin with intentionality. But phenomenologists also move beyond 
Brentano in a number of important ways.
To see how this is so, we can note first that phenomenologists insist that minds are 
irreducibly embodied (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008: chapter 7). The things we think and 
experience—and the way we think and experience them—reflect aspects of the physical 
structure of our body as well as the things our body can do. So intentionality for 
phenomenologists is rooted in our bodies and agency. This motor dimension has to be 
part of a full picture of intentionality.
Additionally, phenomenologists argue that we don’t just think thoughts or perceive things. 
We feel feelings. And these feelings—affective phenomena like emotions, moods, and 
bodily states—play an important role in shaping how the world and other people show up 
for us, experientially (Colombetti 2014). Feelings are an essential part of the way we are 
intentionally open and responsive to our world.
Phenomenologists thus move beyond Brentano by developing a multi-dimensional 
approach to intentionality that respects not only its mental character but also its 
embodied and affective dimensions. Next, I will consider these three dimensions of 
intentionality—mental intentionality, motor intentionality, and affective intentionality—in 
turn.  To be clear: from a phenomenological perspective, these dimensions are 
interrelated. Intentionality is an integrative achievement not of minds, brains, or bodies 
but of persons—subjects open and responsive to physical and social environments. So, 
while we can make a conceptual distinction between these different dimensions to clarify 
intentionality’s overall structure—as well as differentiate various ways intentionality that 
becomes disturbed in psychopathology—we should remain mindful that these dimensions 
are interwoven within the practice of intentionality conceived of as an embodied and 
situated activity of the whole person.
Mental Intentionality
For Husserl, the structure of intentionality can be analyzed into two components: the 
object as intended by consciousness (noema), and the conscious act that intends the 
object (noesis). In other words, noema picks out the object-side of the intentional relation 
(i.e. what is given to consciousness) whereas noesis picks out the subject-side (i.e. how the 
“what” is given to consciousness). For example, if I remember the front door of my 
grandmother’s house, the noema is the door-as-remembered; it is what is made present to 
consciousness. The noesis is the act of remembering; it is how the door is made present to 
consciousness. However, if I visit my grandmother’s home, the intentional object will 
remain the same—her front door—but now the noetic structure through which I intend 
the front door will be different. It will now be a perceptual act—and the noesis–noema
structure of that act will vary accordingly. Husserl argues that all conscious acts have this 
1
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noetic structure. It is the basic framework for our intentional engagement with the 
world.
In addition to its noetic structure, Husserl describes another important feature of mental 
intentionality. He says intentionality “wants to go to the object itself … that is, to an 
intuition that gives the object itself, to an intuition that is in itself the consciousness of 
having the object itself” (Husserl 2001: 126). He continues: “This directedness is … a 
striving, it is from the very beginning ‘driving at’ a satisfaction” (Husserl 2001: 126). 
There are several points here worthy of consideration.
Perhaps most important is that, for Husserl, intentionality is not a passive state in which 
the external world presses itself onto a yielding observer but instead a dynamic, 
temporally extended activity (i.e. a kind of “striving” or “driving at satisfaction”). This 
claim aligns Husserl with contemporary enactive approaches to perception stressing the 
interdependence of perception and action (e.g. Bower and Gallagher 2013; Hurley 1998; 
Noë 2004; Thompson 2005).
Consider seeing a red ball. When we see the ball, we don’t actually see the whole thing. 
We only see the part or “aspect” facing us. Nevertheless, Husserl insists we experience
the ball as a complete three-dimensional object with density, spatial extension, and 
unseen parts potentially capable of being seen. These unseen parts are part of the 
content of our experience, co-given alongside the visible parts: “Of necessity a physical 
thing can be given only ‘one-sidedly’ … A physical thing is necessarily given in mere 
‘modes of appearance’ in which necessarily a core of ‘what is actually presented’ is 
apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of ‘co-givenness,’ which is not givenness 
proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness” (Husserl 1998: 94).
For Husserl, this feature of our experience can be understood by looking at the 
intentional structure of perception’s “striving” character. The reason unseen parts of the 
ball are co-given is because we experience the ball as offering possibilities for 
engagement—what James Gibson terms “affordances” (1966, 1979)—that provide 
increasingly determinate specifications of the ball’s nature. Put otherwise, the ball 
affords various interactions (touching, handling, picking up, throwing, etc.) specified both 
by (1) our possession of kinaesthetic capacities (e.g. the ability to turn our torso, tilt our 
head, reach for the ball and grasp it) as well as (2) our implicit practical knowledge of 
how exercising these capacities will reliably alter our experience by bringing hidden sides 
into view. These affordances are part of the noematic content of perception.
Additionally, since intentionality is embodied and situated, Husserl argues that this 
striving isn’t just going on in our head. It’s a relational process through which we stretch 
outside of ourselves and interact with the world. And the objects partially constitutive of 
these relations present qualities—again, given as noematic content—affording different 
kinds of interaction; they establish an object’s meaning. Taking seriously the striving 
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character of intentionality thus illuminates how perception involves a “constitutive duet” 
between subject and object (Husserl 2001: 52).
Motor Intentionality
As we’ve seen, Husserl is sensitive to the role embodiment plays in shaping the character 
and content of intentionality. But Merleau-Ponty takes this idea further. He argues that 
we are fundamentally animate bodies open and responsive to a meaningful environment; 
this bodily openness is constitutive of our being-in-the-world. And this openness means 
that our embodied being is intentional all the way down—including prenoetic levels of 
worldly engagement (Gallagher 2005). For Merleau-Ponty, this is a “deeper” intentionality 
“beneath the intentionality of representation” (2002: 140 n. 54).
Merleau-Ponty observes that, within the ebb and flow of everyday life, we routinely act—
in an organized and purposive way—without conscious reflection, planning, or even full 
awareness. “Motor intentionality” refers to the integrated suite of skills, capacities, and 
habits—not all of which are available to consciousness—that enable this unreflective 
action (Rietveld 2008). It picks out a way of being directed toward the world different 
than we find within the noetic structure of mental intentionality (Dreyfus 2005; Kelly 
2002).
Consider reaching for a coffee mug while reading the newspaper. We don’t first locate the 
mug—along with different parts of our body—and then think about various movements 
and postural adjustments needed to carry out our reach. Instead, we simply reach for the 
mug spontaneously—and crucially, our grasp calibrates itself accordingly. Body and world 
together organize a coherent and meaningful experience. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
“From the outset the grasping movement is magically at its completion; it can begin only 
by anticipating its end” (2002: 119).
Once again, this dimension of intentionality is rooted in our embodiment. This is because 
we don’t merely inhabit our bodies as objects, as physical things with properties similar 
to other objects in the world. We also live through our bodies onto the world; we 
experience them from the inside, as subjects (Carman 1999). Accordingly, we can 
unthinkingly grasp the mug because have an immediate proprioceptive and kinaesthetic 
sense of where our limbs are in space and what sort of skilful actions are possible within
that space. This is a tacit pre-reflective bodily awareness operative without deliberate 
reflection (Legrand 2007). Moreover—and to return to an earlier point—we immediately 
perceive the mug as meaningful: as an artefact affording a range of different interactions 
determined by the structure of the cup, the context in which we encounter it, and our 
preeflective awareness of our body as an intentional vehicle.
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For Merleau-Ponty, motor intentionality is pervasive throughout everyday life: changing 
gears while driving, brushing our teeth, tying our shoes, typing on our laptop, stroking 
our child’s cheek while singing a lullaby, playing tennis, practicing guitar scales, lunging 
for the bottle of wine about to fall off the table, and many other contexts of spontaneous 
action. In these cases, there is a particular form of bodily understanding of objects and 
environments—as well as our situatedness within these environments—that allows us to 
be immediately open and responsive to the things happening around us. For Merleau-
Ponty, “[t]hese elucidations enable us clearly to understand motility as basic 
intentionality. Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I 
can’” (2002: 159).
Affective Intentionality
For phenomenologists, affective states are not internal states hidden away inside brains 
and bodies. They are embodied and enactive processes that connect us to a shared world 
and guide our dealings with it (Colombetti and Krueger 2015; Krueger 2014; Krueger and 
Szanto 2016). Importantly, they also have a revelatory character that shapes how the 
world shows up for us in our experience (Slaby and Stephan 2008).
Heidegger, for example, argues that moods aren’t simply add-ons providing color to other 
mental phenomena. Moods are examples of affective phenomena that disclose the world 
as being a certain way. A mood, he says, “has always already disclosed, in every case, 
Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself toward 
something” (Heidegger 1962: 176). For Heidegger, moods set up our encounter with the 
world by constituting our sense of belonging to it. They reveal the world as a space of 
practical purposes, values, goals, and activities—a space of meaning—and in this sense 
they are primordial phenomena presupposed by the intelligibility of our thoughts, 
experiences, and actions (Ratcliffe 2008: 48).
Sartre offers a vivid example of the revelatory character of affectivity. After reading a text 
late into the night, we find it increasingly difficult to focus on the words or their meaning. 
For Sartre, our eyestrain is first “indicated by objects of the world; i.e., by the book which 
I read. It is with more difficulty that the words are detached from the undifferentiated 
ground which they constitute; they may tremble, quiver; their meaning can be derived 
only with effort …” (1989: 332). In this case, as focusing on the words becomes more 
difficult, we shift our attention from the words (experienced as blurry, unstable, or 
lacking meaning) to the affective quality of the pain around our eyes and temples. For 
Sartre, this case highlights the Janus-faced intentional structure of affectivity: affective 
states convey information about self and non-self.
This revelatory role of affectivity is supported by different streams of empirical work. 
Several studies indicate that subjects estimate the grade of an incline to be steeper when 
wearing a heavy backpack as opposed to not wearing one, or when they feel fatigued as 
3
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opposed to refreshed (Proffitt et al. 1995; Proffitt et al. 2001). Even the presence of a 
supportive friend—actually present or merely imagined—leads subjects to perceive the 
incline as less steep than when alone (Schnall et al. 2008). The affective support we 
receive from others shapes how we perceive the world and its affordances. A similar 
dynamic appears to be at work in the social world. There is evidence, for example, that 
shared affect is a crucial component of empathy. It allows individuals to pick up on the 
ways others are responsive to environmental affordances, and in so doing, to share and 
understand their perspective on the world (Kiverstein 2015).
Without this orienting function of shared affect, however—such as in autistic spectrum 
disorder (ASD)—individuals struggle to get grip on what others find important in a given 
situation and have difficulty relating to them. This absence of “affective framing” (Maiese 
2015) is one of the reasons people with ASD struggle to comfortably inhabit the common 
space of the social world.
Disruptions of Intentionality
Phenomenologically informed psychopathologists argue that the generative disorder of 
schizophrenia is a disturbance of the first-person perspective (Sass and Parnas 2003; see 
also Henriksen and Nordgaard 2014; Krueger and Henriksen 2016). According to this so-
called ipseity disturbance model (IDM), this disturbance can include a diminished sense 
of existing as a bodily subject, a weakened sense of ownership of one’s thoughts and 
experience, a gradual fragmentation or loss of coherence of the field of awareness, and 
disturbed self–world, self–other boundaries (Parnas et al. 2005).
These phenomenological descriptions can be enriched by highlighting how various forms 
of intentional disruptions co-occur with or exacerbate disruptions of ipseity. For example, 
Fuchs (2007) draws on Husserl’s (1991) analysis of “inner time consciousness” to relate 
schizophrenic disorders to the temporal structure of consciousness. For Husserl, the 
temporal microstructure of consciousness—as intentional—consists of a dynamic self-
organizing process comprised of both a retention of what I have just seen, heard, or 
thought, as well as an anticipatory protention of what I expect to continue seeing, 
hearing, or thinking. This temporal synthesis is a tacit background process organizing our 
experiences into sequences of coherent units.
In schizophrenia, this temporal microstructure of intentional consciousness can become 
fragmented (Fuchs 2007: 233). Consequently, patients’ capacity to make sense of 
situations, experiences, and the behavior of others is impaired. In the early stages of 
psychosis, for instance, experiences such as the loss of one’s train of thought, difficulty 
following conversations, or difficulty maintaining narrative coherence are common (see 
also Gallagher 2007). One patient reports: “I’m a good listener but often I’m not really 
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taking it in. I nod my head and smile but it’s just a lot of jumbled up words to 
me” (McGhie and Chapman 1961: 106).
This temporal disruption also destabilizes the dynamics of motor intentionality. One 
patient says:
I found recently that I was thinking of myself doing things before I would do them. 
If I am going to sit down, for example, I have got to think of myself and almost see 
myself sitting down before I do it. It’s the same with other things like washing, 
eating, and even dressing …
(McGhie and Chapman 1961: 107)
In these cases, patients take up normally spontaneous, unreflective actions in a deliberate 
and thoughtful way; each movement is considered in isolation from the others, leading to 
a “disautomation” compromising their ability to negotiate physical and social 
environments (Fuchs 2007: 233). Maiese highlights how this disautomation also involves 
a disruption of affective intentionality—a disturbance of what she terms “affective 
framing”—in that “the body is no longer ‘feelingly’ integrated into its lived 
environment” (Maiese 2015: 180). This loss of bodily-affective responsivity results in a 
diminished sense of ownership, agency, and control. Disturbances of motor and affective 
intentionality also characterize some of the disruptions of embodiment, spatial cognition, 
and perception of social and environmental affordances characteristic of conditions like 
depression and Moebius Syndrome (Krueger and Taylor-Aiken 2016; de Haan et al. 2013; 
Slaby et al. 2013). In sum, focusing on disruptions of intentionality—along with 
approaches like IDM—can in this way deepen and enrich our understanding of core 
disturbances involved in different psychopathologies.
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